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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel biometric 
cryptosystem for vectorial biometrics named symmetric keyring 
encryption (SKE) inspired by Rivest’s keyring model (2016). 
Unlike conventional biometric secret-binding primitives, such as 
fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault, the proposed scheme reframes 
the biometric secret-binding problem as a fuzzy symmetric 
encryption problem with a notion called resilient vector pair. In 
this study, the pair resembles the encryption–decryption key pair 
in symmetric key cryptosystems. This notion is realized using the 
index of maximum hashed vectors—a special instance of the 
ranking-based locality-sensitive hashing function. With a simple 
filtering mechanism and [𝒎, 𝒌] Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme, 
we show that SKE, both in theoretical and empirical evaluation, 
can retrieve the exact secret with overwhelming probability for a 
genuine input yet negligible probability for an imposter input. 
Though SKE can be applied to any vectorial biometrics, we adopt 
the fingerprint vector as a case of study in this work. The 
experiments have been performed under several subsets of FVC 
2002, 2004, and 2006 datasets. We formalize and analyze the threat 
model of SKE that encloses several major security attacks. 
Index Terms—Biometrics, Fingerprint, Symmetric Encryption, 
Locality-sensitive Hashing, Keyring Model. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
onventional security systems rely on a deterministic model 
to ensure information security [1]. This model works 
efficiently under the presumption that a legitimate user always 
holds the consistency by presenting a constant, uniquely and 
specifiable cryptographic key. However, in practice, situations 
arise in which human and other factors undermine the 
possibility of exactness and uniqueness in a security 
cryptosystem. A deterministic security system may not work 
when fuzziness is involved, for example in biometric systems 
in which authentication takes place by an individual presenting 
a biological trait e.g. fingerprint. Fingerprint features, however, 
are prone to distortion due to the presence of noise during the 
acquisition process. This prompts the growth of error-tolerant 
cryptographic systems, which are considered to be more 
feasible under the circumstances in which deterministic models 
do not apply. 
The integration of cryptographic schemes and biometrics, a 
special instance of error-tolerant cryptographic systems, is 
indeed not new. This line of study is called biometric 
cryptosystems or biometric encryption [2]. Biometric 
cryptosystems are devised to protect secrets such as private 
keys by either binding/retrieving secrets with biometrics or 
generating secrets from biometrics directly. Fuzzy commitment 
[3], fuzzy vault [4], and fuzzy extractor [5] are three primitive 
instances of biometric cryptosystems. 
In this paper, we introduce a novel biometric cryptosystem for 
vectorial biometrics (biometric representation that appears in a 
fixed-size vector form) and secret binding called symmetric 
keyring encryption (SKE). SKE is an error-tolerant symmetric 
encryption construct that is motivated by the recent Rivest’s 
keyring model [6]. The key ingredient of Rivest’s keyring 
model is a notion coined resilient vector (RV) pair that is 
analogous to the random key pair in conventional symmetric 
cryptosystems. We illustrate the idea as follows. Let Alice 
encrypt a secret by a RV Ω(𝐱), which is derived from a sample 
set 𝐱 , known as keyring [6]. An instance of keyring is 
biometrics. The model allows either Alice herself or another 
user Bob to decrypt the secret via Ω(𝐱′) that is similar to Ω(𝐱). 
Decryption succeeds with probability ℙ(Ω(𝐱) = Ω(𝐱′)) =
𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) > 𝜏, where S(·,·) is a similarity measure between 𝐱 and 
𝐱′ and 𝜏 is a preset threshold value. On the contrary, anyone 
who attempts to decrypt the secret with keyring that is distinct 
from 𝐱 would fail certainly if 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) < 𝜏. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present 
two preliminaries relevant to SKE: index of maximum (IoM) 
hashing and Rivest’s keyring model. In Section III, SKE is 
described in terms of binding and retrieving phases, followed 
by Section IV that elaborates the resilient property of SKE. The 
threat model and the associated security analyses are presented 
in Section V. In Section VI, we provide a thorough empirical 
evaluation and analysis on SKE based on the fingerprint vectors 
generated from FVC (Fingerprint Verification Competition) 
benchmark datasets. We also provide a comparison with other 
competing biometric cryptosystems. Lastly, concluding 
remarks are given in Section VII. 
 Related Works 
In this section, we review several biometric cryptosystem 
primitives relevant to our scheme. One of the notable works is 
by Juels and Wattenberg that put forward the concept of fuzzy 
commitment [3]. To be specific, consider a person with his 
biometric input of different but close readings 𝐱 ∈ ℱ𝑛  and 𝐱′ ∈
ℱ𝑛 in a finite field ℱ. For fuzzy commitment, binary biometric 
features i.e. ℱ = 2 is used to generate an offset 𝜹 ∈ ℱ𝑛 , where 
𝜹 = 𝐱′ ⊕ 𝐱. In this sense, the Hamming weight of the offset 
||𝜹|| indicates the Hamming distance of 𝐱, and 𝐱′. During the 
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enrollment, given a random codeword  𝐜 ∈ ℱ𝑘 , which is an 
encoded secret of size ℱ𝑘, one can conceal 𝐜 by generating a 
secure sketch 𝐬𝐬 = 𝐜 ⊕ 𝐱  with 𝐱 . The codeword c is then 
hashed with a one-way hash function 𝐻 and stored along with 
ss as a commitment (𝐻(𝐜), 𝐬𝐬). In the verification stage, given 
(𝐻(𝐜), 𝐬𝐬), we can compute the corrupted codeword such as 
𝐜′ = 𝐬𝐬 ⊕ 𝐱′ = 𝜹 ⊕ 𝐜  with 𝐱′ . With a decoding algorithm 
Decode𝑡 with error tolerance capacity 𝑡, if ||𝜹|| ≤ 𝑡, c can be 
recovered from 𝐜′  i.e. Decode𝑡(𝐜
′) = 𝐜 . Finally, the 
decommitment is deemed successful if 𝐻(𝐜) =
𝐻(Decode𝑡(𝐜
′)) . The fuzzy commitment scheme is 
conceptually simple and its error tolerance mechanism solely 
relies on error correction codes (ECCs) such as Bose–
Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem (BCH), Reed–Solomon codes etc. 
[3]. The security of the fuzzy commitment scheme is attributed 
to the reconstruction complexity of codeword 𝐜, provided an 
adversary has no knowledge of 𝐜  or 𝐱  from 𝐻(𝐜)  under a 
random oracle model (ROM). A practical shortcoming of fuzzy 
commitment is the difficulty to provide a rigorous proof about 
security over the nonuniformity of 𝐱.  
Another major biometric cryptosystem primitive that also 
carries an error tolerance property is the fuzzy vault [4]. Let 
𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. Given an unordered set 𝐱 = {𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛} ∈ ℱ
𝑛  such as 
fingerprint minutiae, if secret, 𝑠 ∈ ℱ𝑘is encoded as coefficients 
of a (𝑘 − 1)-th order polynomial f(·), then a genuine set 𝐆 =
{(𝑥1, 𝑓(𝑥1)), … , (𝑥𝑛 , 𝑓(𝑥𝑛))} can be generated. The fuzzy vault 
protects the polynomial 𝑓 by concealing 𝐆 in a vault 𝐕. This 
can be performed by mixing a number of chaff entries 𝑟, under 
a chaff set 𝐂 = {(𝑥𝑐(1), 𝑦𝑐(1)), … , (𝑥𝑐(𝑟), 𝑦𝑐(𝑟))} , i.e., 𝐕 =
𝐆 ⋃ 𝐂 . These chaff entries are to be randomly generated and 
should not lie on 𝑓 . The chaff set 𝐂 is meant to prevent an 
adversary distinguishing 𝐆 from 𝐂. For secret retrieval, given a 
query set 𝐱′ = {𝑥′1, … , 𝑥′𝑛} ∈ ℱ
𝑛 , the vault set would be 
unlocked leading to the revelation of 𝑓 if 𝐱′ is sufficiently close 
to 𝐱 by means of error tolerance. Here, we explain the details of 
standard polynomial reconstruction via polynomial 
interpolation over an unlocking set  𝐔 = {(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑓(𝑥𝑗)}𝑗=1
𝜔
⊆ 𝐕 of 
size 𝜔 ≤ 𝑛. U can be generated by identifying the overlapped 
entries of 𝐱 and 𝐱′ across the vault 𝐕 of size |𝐕| = 𝑛 + 𝑟. In 
practice, 𝐔 may also consist of chaff entries due to the errors in 
the noisy query set 𝐱′ . Therefore, the actual number of 
overlapped entries of 𝐱  and 𝐱′  is 𝑡 ≤ 𝜔 . If 𝑘 < 𝑡 , then 
redundancy with 𝑡 − 𝑘 >0 in the unlocking set 𝐔  must be 
satisfied to enable error correction. In this sense, 𝑡 also can be 
deemed as an error tolerance capacity in the context of fuzzy 
vault. 
Ideally, the mixing of genuine and chaff sets should be 
uniformly random for ensuring maximum security. However, 
this assumption does not hold in practice. Over the years, 
several attempts have been made to rectify this very issue. For 
instance, Clancy et al. [7] devised a minimum distant criterion 
away from the genuine set to place the chaff set randomly to 
eliminate overlapping. This approach was later criticized that 
the chaff set can be easily recognized and would be prone to a 
statistical attack, which has a lower complexity than the brute-
force attack [8]. Li et al. [9] suggested generating the chaff set 
in accordance with a minutia descriptor’s distribution so that a 
more “natural” chaff placement can be made. However, this 
indeed contradicts the uniformity principle of a genuine chaff-
set mixture. Moreover, Merkle et al. [10] observed that even the 
chaff set follows a minutia descriptor’s distribution; the chaff 
set is unlikely to reside in those regions that are frequently 
occupied by the genuine set. The use of additional information 
such as the minutia point’s orientation to generate the chaff set 
has been proposed by Nandakumar et al. [11]. However, 
another study [12] reveals that the minutia points in close 
proximity tend to have a similar orientation, facilitating the 
adversary to filter out the chaff set from the genuine set. 
Another major concern of practical fuzzy vaults (and all other 
biometric cryptosystems) is the secret retrieval rate (resilience), 
which is closely associated with the biometric feature quality. 
In particular, there exists a failure circumstance such as false-
reject despite a genuine feature being input due to large 
intraclass variations i.e. a query set overlapping with a chaff set. 
As the failure rate of a single decoding step via polynomial 
interpolation can be measured as 1 − (
𝜔
𝑘
) / (
|𝐕|
𝑘
), we observe 
that (
𝜔
𝑘
) / (
|𝐕|
𝑘
) > (1 −
|𝐕|−𝜔
|𝐕|−𝑘
)
𝑘
 ≈ 𝑒
−(
𝑘(|𝐕|−𝜔)
|𝐕|−𝑘
)
=
1
λ(𝑘)
, and 
one can expect the failure rate to be negligible after λ(𝑘) 
iterations (proportional to 𝑘). That is, after repeatedly decoding 
over randomly selected 𝑘 unlocking pairs (𝑥𝑗 , 𝑓(𝑥𝑗)} from the 
unlocking set 𝐔. The failure rate can be minimized by repeating 
such a decoding process. One typical instance is iterative 
Lagrange interpolation [13]. However, the number of iterations 
required by the iterative Lagrange interpolation is impractically 
large for a huge feature size. One can further reduce the number 
of iterations required by using more efficient decoding 
algorithm, i.e., Guruswami Sudan decoder [14], however, it still 
requires 29  iterations [15] for decoding. In addition, these 
techniques are restricted by the error tolerance capacity t due to 
the decoding algorithm that employed. For instance, the 
correctable error number for Guruswami Sudan decoder [14] is 
bounded as 𝑛 − √𝑛(𝑘 − 1) , which requires 𝑡 ≥ 𝑛 −
√𝑛(𝑘 − 1). Apart from this, a stronger bound can be derived as 
follows: with n minutia points and a polynomial of order 𝑘 − 1, 
the number of errors that can be corrected after λ(𝑘) iterations, 
in principle, is bounded as 𝑛 − 𝑡 ≤ 𝑘. This suggests that 𝐱 =
{𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛} and 𝐱′ = {𝑥′1, … , 𝑥′𝑛} must overlap at least 50%, 
which does not seem realistic for fingerprint minutiae [16].  
The brute-force security of fuzzy vault, another key concern, 
is attributed to the hardness of polynomial reconstruction. This 
is related to the list-decoding problem of enumerating valid 
solutions over specific overlapping requirement (𝑡) in between 
𝐱 and 𝐱′ (see [17] for a detailed survey). Recall that the failure 
rate can be expressed as 1 − (
𝜔
𝑘
) / (
|𝐕|
𝑘
) and 𝑡 ≤ 𝜔. Hence, 
the failure rate can be used to characterize the brute-force 
complexity of fuzzy vault as (
|𝐕|
𝑘
) / (
𝜔
𝑘
)  [18]. Notably, the 
brute-force complexity measures how many iterations are 
required for an adversary to reconstruct the polynomial 
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successfully. For instance, Nandakumar et al. [11] and Li et al. 
[9] reported their realizations with brute-force complexity 
around 232 and 235, respectively, which are considerably low 
in practice. Mihailescu [18] pointed out that the practical fuzzy 
vaults are prone to low brute-force security. This could be due 
to the limited number of chaff entries that can be added (𝑟), the 
limited number of minutia points ( 𝑛 ) available, and the 
polynomial order (𝑘 − 1) constraint. 
 Motivations and Contributions 
In this work, we perceive the biometric secret-binding 
problem as a symmetric encryption–decryption problem. In 
light of this, we devise SKE that comprises Shamir’s secret-
sharing scheme, RV pairs, and a simple filtering mechanism. In 
our disposition, an RV pair resembles a symmetric key pair in 
symmetric cryptosystems and is realized by the respective 
hashed enrolled and query biometric vectors. The hashing is 
carried out by IoM hashing with a niche property that preserves 
the similarity between different inputs [19]. 
Though both fuzzy vault and SKE use a polynomial to bind 
a secret, the genuine set of SKE (analog to the plain text in 
symmetric key systems) is encrypted by the RV unlike a chaff 
set that is required for genuine set concealment in fuzzy vault. 
Hence, secret retrieval is merely a reverse operation i.e. 
decryption by means of query RV followed by the polynomial 
interpolation.  
As discussed in the previous section, the resilience is another 
major concern of biometric cryptosystems due to the noisy 
nature of biometrics. In our scheme, we show that strong 
resilience of SKE can be achieved with an overwhelming 
probability for a genuine biometric input, merely with the IoM 
hashing and a simple filtering mechanism during decryption 
(Section IV). 
Though SKE is a biometric cryptosystem, it inherits the 
legacy of symmetric key cryptosystems. Hence, its threat model 
includes that from classical biometric cryptosystems such as 
brute-force attack and false-accept attack. Besides, we consider 
another notion called tag indistinguishability adopted from the 
concept of key privacy or anonymity (unable to differentiate 
which key is being used for encryption) that is often used in 
public key cryptosystems [20] and identity-based 
cryptosystems [21]. In our context, as a biometric input is 
unique and is lifetime associated to an individual, the notion of 
tag indistinguishability offers strong privacy protection to any 
user to remain anonymous while encryption is exercised by 
SKE. We will analyze them formally and comprehensively in 
Section V. 
To sum up, the contributions of this paper are four-fold: 
1. We put forward a novel simplistic biometric secret-binding 
scheme for vectorial biometrics, namely SKE that is based on 
the notion of symmetric key cryptosystems. 
2. We demonstrate the innovative use of IoM hashing that 
allows one to generate abundant IoM hashed entries as genuine 
entries in SKE without being restricted by the original biometric 
vector size. Hence, the failure probability of secret retrieval via 
Shamir’s secret-sharing mechanism due to corrupted genuine 
entries can be reduced radically. Besides, this unique trait 
allows us to choose a higher order polynomial, which is 
beneficial to strengthen the brute-force and false-accept 
securities. 
3. We formalize and analyze the threat model of SKE that 
consists of three major security threats, namely brute-force 
attack, false-accept attack, and tag indistinguishability and 
show that SKE resists these attacks. 
4. Though SKE was motivated as an error-tolerant symmetric 
encryption construct, it serves as a biometric template 
protection (BTP) scheme as well [22] [23]. Therefore, we show 
that SKE satisfies the four design criteria of BTP, namely 
noninvertibility, unlinkability, revocability, and performance 
(Section VII). 
Although SKE is generic for any vectorial biometrics, we 
showcase the realization of SKE with fingerprint vectors [24]. 
We show the empirical results comprehensively with five 
subsets of fingerprint benchmarks under FVC 2002, FVC 2004, 
and FVC 2006. 
The MATLAB code of SKE is available at (goo.gl/8EoLsp), 
allowing researchers to reproduce or verify the results of this 
study. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we give a brief introduction about Rivest’s 
keyring model as well as IoM hashing. 
 Rivest’s Keyring Model 
The keyring model is an error-tolerant symmetric 
cryptosystem proposed by Rivest [6]. The keyring refers to a 
“bag of keywords” that is distributed in a pair to both sender 
and receiver. This model relies on the keyword-matching game, 
which is favorable for two similar keyrings. Each keyring can 
be represented as a binary vector where each single bit "1" 
corresponds to a particular keyword in the universe set 𝒰. For 
Alice and Bob who have similar keyrings 𝐱 ∈ 𝒰 and 𝐱′ ∈ 𝒰 
respectively, random vectors with length m such as 𝝓𝐱 =
{𝜑x(1), … , 𝜑x(𝑚)} ∈ 𝒰
𝑚  and 𝝓𝐱′ = {𝜑x′(1), … , 𝜑x′(𝑚)} ∈ 𝒰
𝑚 
can be generated through their respective resilient set vectorizer 
(RSV), Ω(𝐱, 𝑚, 𝐍) → 𝝓𝐱 and Ω(𝐱′, 𝑚, 𝐍) → 𝝓𝐱′ with a shared 
nonce 𝐍 (e.g., public random numbers). The random vector pair 
{𝝓𝐱, 𝝓𝐱′} can then be employed to encrypt or decrypt a secret 
along with an ECC. 
Formally, a RSV is a set vectorizer with length 𝑚, along with 
the property that for any two keyrings 𝐱  and 𝐱′  with 𝑃 =
J(𝐱 , 𝐱′) = |𝐱 ⋂ 𝐱′|/|𝐱 ⋃ 𝐱′|  where J(. , . )  is the Jaccard 
similarity coefficient. It follows 𝑡 ∼ Bin(𝑚, 𝑃) where 𝑡 is the 
number of positions wherein 𝝓𝐱  and 𝝓𝐱′  agree. More 
explicitly, if a fraction 𝑃 of 𝐱 ⋃ 𝐱′ is shared, then the fraction 
of the positions where 𝝓𝐱  and 𝝓𝐱′  agree follows a binomial 
distribution parameterized by 𝑚 and 𝑃. In contrast, the number 
of disagree positions can be characterized by the hamming 
weight of the offset ||𝜹|| = ||𝝓𝐱 ⊕ 𝝓𝐱′||. Its expected value is 
𝔼(||𝜹||) = 𝑚(1 − J(𝐱 , 𝐱′)). In Rivest’s proposal, he stated a 
way of playing the keyword-matching game by means of min-
hashing [25] as the resilient set vectorizer. 
Rivest’s keyring model resembles fuzzy commitment in such 
a sense that Alice conceals a codeword 𝐜 = {𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑚} ∈ 𝒰
𝑚 
with 𝝓𝐱  via secure sketch 𝐬𝐬 = 𝐜 ⊕ 𝝓𝐱 = {𝑐1 ⊕
𝜑x(1), … , 𝑐𝑚 ⊕ 𝜑x(𝑚)}. Then, Bob would be able to identify the 
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nearest codeword 𝐜′  in a reverse manner such as 𝐜′ = 𝐬𝐬 ⊕
𝝓𝐱′ = 𝐜 ⊕ 𝝓𝐱 ⊕ 𝝓𝐱′ = 𝜹 ⊕ 𝐜 . With a suitable ECC over 
tolerance capacity 𝑡, Bob is expected to retrieve the secret with 
a high probability if 𝑡 > 𝔼(||𝜹||) = 𝑚(1 − J(𝐱 , 𝐱′)).  
 Index-of-Max Hashing 
IoM hashing [19] is a special instance of locality-sensitive 
hashing (LSH) [26] that consumes feature vector 𝐱 ∈  ℝ𝑑 over 
continuous domain ℝ𝑑. Let 𝐘 ∈ ℝℱ×𝑑 be a random projection 
matrix composed of ℱ  Gaussian row vectors where each 
follows a standard normal 𝒩(0,1)  distribution. Further, let 
𝐍 = {𝐘1, … , 𝐘𝑚} be an independent random projection matrix 
set. 
Given 𝐱, m, and 𝐍, the IoM hashing is defined as a mapping 
function ΩIoM(𝐱, 𝑚, 𝐍): ℝℱ×𝑑 × ℝ𝑑 × 𝑚 → ℱ𝑚 . The 
operation of ΩIoM(𝐱, 𝑚, 𝐍) is given as follows:  
1. Record the indices of the maximum value computed from 
 𝜑𝐱(𝑖)  =  arg max
𝑖
 〈𝐘𝑖 , 𝐱〉 ∈ ℱ , where 〈, 〉  is the inner 
product. 
2. Repeat step 1 for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 and yield 𝝓𝐱 =
[𝜑𝐱(1), … , 𝜑𝐱(𝑚)]. 
In other words, the IoM hashing [19] embeds x onto a ℱ-
dimensional Gaussian random subspace to output a random 
integer over a field of size ℱ corresponding to the index of the 
maximum value. This process is repeated with 𝑚  sets of 
independent Gaussian random matrices and random integer 
vectors to yield a collection of 𝑚  independent IoM entries, 
𝜑𝐱(𝑖) ∈ {0,1, … ℱ − 1}, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚.  
Both min hashing (suggested in Rivest’s keyring model) and 
IoM hashing essentially follow the LSH spirit [26], and both 
strive to ensure that the two vectors 𝐱  and 𝐱′  with high 
similarity render a higher probability of collision (number of 
agreed entries) between their output vectors 𝝓𝐱,  and 𝝓𝐱′  
respectively. On the contrary, if 𝐱 and 𝐱′ are far apart, it will 
result in a low probability of hash collision between 𝝓𝐱, and 
𝝓𝐱′ .  
Specifically, let 𝝓𝐱 = [𝜑𝐱(1), … , 𝜑𝐱(𝑚) ] and 𝝓𝐱′ =
[𝜑𝐱′(1) , … , 𝜑𝐱′(𝑚)]  be the enrolled and query IoM hashed 
vectors, respectively. We can calculate the similarity of 𝝓𝐱 and 
𝝓𝐱′ by measuring their number of collisions 𝑡 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 , where 
𝑋𝑖 ∈ {0,1} is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) 
variable such that 𝑋𝑖 = 1  if 𝜑𝐱(𝑖) = 𝜑𝐱′(𝑖)  and 0 otherwise. 
Formally, one has ℙ(𝑋𝑖 = 1 ) = ℙ(𝜑𝐱(𝑖) = 𝜑𝐱′(𝑖)) = 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱
′), 
where 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) =
1
ℱ
+ ∑ 𝑎𝑗(ℱ)(cos θ)
𝑖∞
𝑗=1  is defined as the 
similarity function of IoM hashing with cos θ =
𝐱∙𝐱′
‖𝐱‖‖𝐱′‖
 and 
𝑎𝑗(ℱ) is the coefficient that satisfies 
1
ℱ
+ ∑ 𝑎𝑗(ℱ) = 1
∞
𝑗=1  [19].  
In this paper, the IoM hashing ΩIoM(𝐱, 𝑚, 𝐍) is portrayed as 
an instance of RSV where 𝐍 corresponds to the public nonce in 
Rivest’s Keyring model and 𝑡 ∼ Bin(𝑚, 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′))  with 
𝔼(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′). 
III. SYMMETRIC KEYRING ENCRYPTION 
SKE inherits the RSV notion from the keyring model as a 
means of symmetric key pair generation. Specifically, IoM 
hashing is naturally adopted by SKE as RSV as presented in 
Section IIB. In what follows, the public random Gaussian 
matrices set in IoM hashing and biometrics in the vector form 
respectively correspond to nonce and keyring in the keyring 
model. We refer different nonce 𝐍 and ?̂? to different random 
Gaussian matrix sets. These nonce 𝐍 and ?̂? are used to generate 
different random vectors 𝝓𝐱 ∈ ℱ
𝑚 and ?̂?𝐱 ∈ ℱ
𝑚 respectively, 
called RVs. The main idea of SKE is as follows. 
 Main Idea of SKE 
Given that SKE is primarily used for secret binding and 
retrieval, we adopt Shamir’s threshold secret-sharing scheme 
for this purpose. Here, a finite field polynomial 𝑓(. ) ∈ ℱ of 
order 𝑘 − 1 is used for secret embedding.  
During enrollment, a user with an input biometric vector 𝐱 
first generates an RV 𝝓𝐱 through RSV with nonce 𝐍, together 
with its polynomial projected correspondences, 𝑓(𝝓𝐱) . A 
genuine set 𝐆 = {(𝜑𝐱(1), 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(1))) , … , (𝜑𝐱(𝑚), 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑚)))} is 
formed based on 𝝓𝐱 and 𝑓(𝝓𝐱). At this point, SKE resembles 
fuzzy vault where 𝐆 is used to bind a secret over the coefficients 
of 𝑓. However, instead of concealing G with a chaff set, we 
merely hide 𝑓(𝝓𝐱) . This is done via a second RV ?̂?𝐱 =
{?̂?𝐱(1), … , ?̂?𝐱(𝑚)}  with nonce ?̂? . The second RV acts as a 
random "keyset," which is independent of 𝝓𝐱  to encrypt 
𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)), i = 1,…,m and yields a public secure sketch 𝐬𝐬 =
{𝑠𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑠𝑚} , where 𝑠𝑠𝑖 = ?̂?𝐱(𝑖) ⊕ 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)) . As such, the 
encryption simply follows fuzzy commitment with an XOR 
operation yet accompanies with an authentication tag 𝐓𝐀𝐆 =
{tag1, … , tag𝑚  }, where tag𝑖 = 𝐻(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)||𝑠𝑠𝑖||?̂?𝐱(𝑖)) and 𝐻 is a 
cryptographic secure one-way hash function. Note that || refers 
to concatenation. 
During secret retrieval, a query RV pair (𝝓𝐱′ , ?̂?𝐱′ ) can be 
generated with nonce (𝐍, ?̂?) from the query biometric vector 𝐱′. 
By doing so, one can verify the integrity of the secure sketch 
along with the authentication tag𝑖  empowered filtering 
mechanism. To be specific, as 𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)) ⊕ ?̂?𝐱(𝑖) and if all 
the three conditions are satisfied i.e. 𝜑𝐱(𝑖) = 𝜑𝐱′(𝑖) , ?̂?𝐱(𝑖) =
?̂?𝐱′(𝑖), and 𝑠𝑠𝑖 remain unaltered, then one can generate tag′𝑖 =
𝐻(𝜑𝐱′(𝑖)||𝑠𝑠𝑖||?̂?𝐱′(𝑖)) that appears identical to tag𝑖. Therefore, 
the decryption succeeds and yields 𝑓′(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)) = 𝑠𝑠𝑖 ⊕ ?̂?𝐱′(𝑖) =
𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)). On the other hand, if not all the three conditions hold, 
then 𝑓′(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)) ≠ 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖))  and decryption fails. From this 
perspective, when tag′𝑖 = tag𝑖 , a genuine pair 
(𝜑𝐱(𝑖), 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖))) ∈ 𝐆  can be revealed subject to 𝐻 () must 
satisfy the collision resistant property. For a sufficient number 
of revealed genuine pairs, one can construct an unlocking set 
𝐔 = {(𝜑𝐱(𝑗), 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑗)))}
𝑗=1
𝑡
⊆ 𝐆 . If 𝑡 ≥ 𝑘 , the secret can be 
retrieved via polynomial interpolation using 𝐔. The high-level 
overview of SKE is illustrated in Figure 1. The detailed steps of 
enrollment and secret retrieval will be given in the following 
subsections. 
 Enrollment 
Given input 𝐱 ∈  ℝ𝑑, two different nonce 𝐍, ?̂?, parameter 𝑚, 
a finite field polynomial with degree 𝑘 − 1 𝑓(. ) , and a one-
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way hash function 𝐻 :  {0,1}∗ → {0,1}ℓ  , the enrollment 
procedure of SKE is as follows: 
1. Generate 𝝓𝐱 ← Ω
IoM(𝐱, 𝑚, 𝐍)  and ?̂?𝐱 ←
ΩIoM(𝐱, 𝑚, ?̂?), where 𝝓𝐱 = {𝜑𝐱(1), … , 𝜑𝐱(𝑚)} and ?̂?𝐱 =
{?̂?𝐱(1), … , ?̂?𝐱(𝑚)}. 
2. Perform polynomial projection to generate 𝑓(𝝓𝐱) =
{𝑓(𝜑𝐱(1)), … , 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑚))}. 
3. Encrypt 𝑓(𝝓𝐱) to yield secure sketch 𝐬𝐬 = {?̂?𝐱(1) ⊕
𝑓(𝜑𝐱(1)), … , ?̂?𝐱(𝑚) ⊕ 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑚))}.  
4. Generate authentication tag 𝐓𝐀𝐆 = {tag1, … , tag𝑚} 
where tag𝑖 = 𝐻(𝜑𝐱(𝑖)||𝑠𝑠𝑖||?̂?𝐱(𝑖))  is the one-way 
hashed output. 
5. Store {𝐍, ?̂?, 𝐓𝐀𝐆, 𝒔𝒔} as the public helper data. 
 Secret Retrieval 
Given 𝐱′ ∈  ℝ𝑑  the query biometric vector and the public 
helper data {𝐍, ?̂?, 𝐓𝐀𝐆, 𝐬𝐬}  with input parameter 𝑚  and the 
same one-way hashing 𝐻, the detailed key retrieval steps are as 
follows: 
1. Generate 𝝓𝐱′ ← Ω
IoM(𝐱′, 𝑚, 𝐍)  and ?̂?𝐱′ ←
ΩIoM(𝐱′, 𝑚, ?̂?) , where 𝝓𝐱′ = {𝜑𝐱′(1), … , 𝜑𝐱′(𝑚)}  and 
?̂?𝐱′ = {?̂?𝐱′(1), … , ?̂?𝐱′(𝑚)}. 
2. Compute 𝐓𝐀𝐆′ = {tag′1, … , tag′𝑚 }  , where tag′𝑖 =
H(𝜑𝐱′(𝑖)||𝑠𝑠𝑖||?̂?𝐱′(𝑖)).  
3. Run Algorithm 1 with input {𝐓𝐀𝐆, 𝐓𝐀𝐆′, 𝝓𝐱, 𝝓𝐱′ , 𝐬𝐬} 
and yield unlocking set 𝐔 = {(𝜑𝐱(𝑗), 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑗)))}
𝑗=1
𝑡
⊆ 𝐆.  
4. Perform polynomial reconstruction with 𝐔.  
In step 4, the secret can be retrieved via Lagrange interpolation 
if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑘. Given that we have (𝜑𝐱(𝑖), 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖))) ∈ ℱ × ℱ , this 
means there will be at most ℱ × ℱ numbers of unique genuine 
pairs in 𝐔 . Besides, the choice of ℱ  and 𝑚  is indeed 
interrelated where ℱ < 𝑚 is often opted to realize improved 
accuracy performance [19]. This implies that the key retrieval 
rate could be degraded if one chooses to increase ℱ close or 
equal to 𝑚 . As a solution, a large value of 𝑚  is needed to 
compensate for the increment of ℱ . Consequently, this may 
lead to more nonunique genuine pairs in 𝐔 and increase the 
computation complexity of polynomial interpolation. 
Therefore, filtering out these nonunique genuine pairs as 
detailed in Algorithm 1 is crucial. Note that Unique(𝐔) is a 
function that warrants only unique genuine pairs present in 𝐔. 
The use of TAG in SKE is indispensable as it serves three 
purposes: (1) it performs a conditional check to ensure only 
relevant 𝑠𝑠𝑖 i.e., when tag𝑖 = tag′𝑖, can be decrypted. This can 
be seen as an error-checking mechanism for 𝜑𝐱(𝑖) and 𝜑𝐱′(𝑖) as 
well; (2) data integrity of 𝒔𝒔 is ensured by TAG, as if any 
alteration occurs in 𝑠𝑠𝑖, the decryption would fail. (3) The use 
of TAG facilitates polynomial interpolation by ensuring that 
only genuine pairs are within 𝐔 , and hence secret can be 
retrieved simply with a single step of polynomial reconstruction 
rather than iterative decoding. 
It is useful to illustrate SKE using an example with numerical 
explication. Let x and 𝐱’ be the enrolled and query biometric 
vectors of Alice, respectively. 𝐱 and 𝐱’ are not identical due to 
noise but close.  
Example 1 
Public Algorithm: 𝐻, Algorithm 1 
Public Parameters: 𝑚 = 5, 𝑘 = 3, ℱ = 5  
Enrollment:  
1. Given a secret 𝑠 = 2, Alice encodes the secret to a finite 
field polynomial order 𝑘 − 1 , i.e. 𝑓 = 𝑥2 + 2𝑥 + 𝑠  mod 
(ℱ). Suppose she generates 𝝓x = {3, 1, 2, 3, 2} ∈ ℱ
𝑚 and 
 
Figure 1. High-level Overview of symmetric keyring encryption (SKE) Progression 
Algorithm 1: Filtering mechanism for Error Checking 
Input: 𝐓𝐀𝐆, 𝐓𝐀𝐆′, 𝝓′𝐱, 𝝓′RSV, 𝐬𝐬 
𝐔 ← ∅   
For 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 
       If (TAG𝑖 = TAG′𝑖)  
                     𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖))
′
= 𝑠𝑠𝑖 ⊕ ?̂?𝐱′(𝑖)    
𝐔 ← 𝐔⋃ (𝜑𝐱′(𝑖)  , 𝑓(𝜑𝐱(𝑖))
′
)  
       End if 
End for 
𝐔 ← Unique(𝐔)  
Output: 𝐔 
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?̂?𝐱 = {2, 3, 0, 1, 1} ∈ ℱ
𝑚  with her biometric vector 𝐱 via 
𝐍, and ?̂?, respectively. 
2. Alice performs polynomial projection (𝝓𝐱) = 
{𝑓(3), 𝑓(1), 𝑓(2), 𝑓(3), 𝑓(2)} = {2, 2, 1, 2, 1}. 
3. Alice encrypts 𝑓(𝝓𝐱) via ?̂?𝐱 to generate the secure sketch 
𝐬𝐬, that is 𝐬𝐬 = {10, 10, 01, 10, 01} ⊕ {10, 11, 00, 01, 01} 
= {00, 01, 10, 11, 00} = {0, 1, 2, 3, 0}. She generates 𝐓𝐀𝐆 
= {𝐻(3||0||2) , 𝐻(1||1||3) , 𝐻(2||2||0) , 𝐻(3||3||1) , 
𝐻(2||0||1)}. 
4. Alice stores {𝐍, ?̂?, 𝐓𝐀𝐆, 𝒔𝒔} . 
 
Secret Retrieval:  
1. Alice generates 𝝓𝐱′ = {3, 1, 1, 2, 2} ∈ ℱ
𝑚  and ?̂?𝐱′ =
{2, 3, 1, 0, 1} ∈ ℱ𝑚 with 𝐱′ via 𝐍,  and ?̂?, respectively. 
2. Using the identical one-way hash function, Alice generates 
𝐓𝐀𝐆′ = {𝐻(3||0||2),𝐻(1||1||3), 𝐻(1||2||1), 𝐻(2||3||0), 
𝐻(2||0||1)}. 
3. She runs Algorithm 1 to yield 𝐔. Given that three entries 
of 𝐓𝐀𝐆  and 𝐓𝐀𝐆′  are matched, i.e. 
{𝐻(3||0||2), 𝐻(1||1||3), 𝐻(2||0||1)} , this implies that 
Alice can regenerate 𝑓 with Lagrange interpolation with 
the unique genuine pair, i.e. 𝐔 =
{(3, 𝑃(3)), (1, 𝑃(1)), (2, 𝑃(2))}  because |𝐔| = 𝑡 ≥ 𝑘 . 
The secret can be reconstructed, and the correctness can be 
verified through 𝑓(0) = 𝑓(0)′ = 𝑠 = 2. 
 Note that the choice of 𝐍 and ?̂? are random and independent 
of biometric input though 𝐬𝐬 and TAG are RV or 𝐱  and 𝐱′ 
dependent. Therefore, without knowing 𝐱 or 𝐱′, the knowledge 
of 𝐍  and ?̂?  alone does not offer additional advantage in 
generating the RV, which can reveal the clue for 𝐬𝐬 decryption. 
Figure 2 details the enrollment and secret retrieval operation of 
SKE. 
IV. RESILIENCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we elaborate the resilience property of SKE. 
Suppose a pair of RV entries (enrolled and query), 𝜑𝐱(𝑖)  and 
𝜑𝐱′(𝑖) are generated by 𝐍. The same goes to the other pair, ?̂?𝐱(𝑖) 
and ?̂?𝐱′(𝑖) generated by ?̂?. 
Based on the i.i.d attribute of IoM hashed entries, the 
collision probability of the enrolled and query entries 
is ℙ(𝜑𝐱(𝑖) =  𝜑𝐱′(𝑖)) = 𝑃 = 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱
′) , where 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′)  is the 
compliance similarity function of IoM hashing given in Section 
II(B). The same goes to ℙ(?̂?𝐱(𝑖) =  ?̂?𝐱′(𝑖)) = 𝑃 . Hence, the 
joint collision probability of two probabilities is merely their 
product, i.e. 𝑃2 = (1 − dis(𝐱, 𝐱′))2 due to independent 𝐍 and 
?̂? . In what follows, the number of collision 𝑡  follows 
Bin(𝑚, 𝑃2), where 𝑃2 = (𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′))2 , expected value 𝔼(𝑡) =
𝑚𝑃2, and  variance Var(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑃2(1 − 𝑃2). 
For further resilience evaluation, we let 𝛿 ∈ (0,1)  be a 
fraction of 𝑚 and 𝑘 = ⌈𝛿𝑚⌉. This allows us to define a security 
threshold in terms of the fraction of 𝛿 =
𝑘
𝑚
 rather than solely on 
𝑘. Intuitively, for high resilience, given 𝐱 ∈  ℝ𝑑 to bind a secret 
𝑠 ∈ ℱ𝑘  with parameter (𝑚, 𝛿) , one expects that any similar 
𝐱′ ∈  ℝ𝑑  will retrieve the secret with an overwhelming 
probability (probability close to 1) if 𝔼(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑃2  > 𝑘  or 
𝔼(𝑡)/𝑚 = 𝑃2  > 𝛿. 
Here we give an example to illustrate the resilience of SKE. 
Example 2: Consider a polynomial of order 𝑘 − 1 with 𝑘 =
⌈𝛿𝑚⌉. Suppose 𝑚 = 256 and hence exact secret retrieval is only 
possible if 𝑡 > 𝑘 = ⌈𝛿𝑚⌉ = 192  for 𝛿 =
3
4
. In other words, 
more than 75% of 𝐓𝐀𝐆(𝐓𝐀𝐆′) entries tag𝑖(tag𝑖
′) need to be 
successfully verified (e.g., tag𝑖 = tag′𝑖 ). It is reasonable to 
assume that for two genuine biometric vector pairs, 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) =
0.9  (i.e. 90% similar); hence, the probability of success for 
tag𝑖 = tag′𝑖  is 𝑃
2 = 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′)2 = 0.81. As 𝑡 ~ Bin(256, 0.81) 
with 𝔼(𝑡) = 207 > 𝑘 , the secret can be retrieved with 
ℙ(𝑡 > 192) = 0.989, an overwhelming probability for exact 
secret retrieval. 
 The above example suggests that to achieve high resilience, 
one can decrease 𝛿  so that 𝔼(𝑡)/𝑚 = 𝑃2  > 𝛿  can be easily 
satisfied. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of secret binding and retrieval in SKE. 
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V. SECURITY  
In this section, we present the threat model of SKE. We 
divide the threats of SKE into two categories. First, as SKE is 
essentially a biometric cryptosystem, conventional security 
attacks such as brute-force attack and false-accept attack will be 
discussed. Second, because SKE is a special kind of error-
tolerant symmetric key cryptosystem that incorporates the tag, 
we shall analyze SKE security in terms of tag 
indistinguishability. 
 Security Model 
Before we elaborate each potential security threat, we 
formalize the security model of SKE. Typically, it is 
straightforward to reduce our security to the computational 
hardness in finding 𝑘 out of 𝑚 collisions on TAG subject to 
tag𝑖 = tag
′
𝑖
, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚 by using a ROM over a uniformly 
random query vector. This security can be claimed by asserting 
higher values for ℱ and 𝑚, because doing so can increase the 
difficulty for one to launch a brute-force attack using the same 
one-way hash function 𝐻  under the ROM. However, this 
statement is not sufficient for our security goal, which is to 
show that given a query biometric vector 𝐱′, it is infeasible to 
retrieve the bound secret unless 𝐱′  is close to 𝐱  without 
assuming that 𝐱′ is uniformly random. To resolve this issue, the 
security goal is preferably characterized by the similarity of x 
and 𝐱′, which is more naturally distributed over some random 
distribution, not necessary to be uniform. In light of this, we 
exploit the input structure of the biometric vectors by means of 
their similarity using RSV. Formally, we adopt a random error 
model (See Section 8 in [5], and [27] for similar realization), 
whereby different entries of the RV pair come with a probability 
of colliding i.e. tag𝑖 = tag′𝑖  characterized as 𝑃
2 , and 
noncolliding (errors) given as 1 − 𝑃2 , where 𝑃2 = 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′)2 
(Section II.B). This permits us to show security that is governed 
by the nonuniform biometric vectors and has high resilience can 
be achieved in accordance to their similarity. More importantly, 
our security property holds under the standard model without 
relying on the ROM, but only requires that 𝐻  is collision-
resistant. 
However, it is unrealistic to assume that the error process of 
the biometric vector can be modeled accurately, and same goes 
to collision probability 𝑃  estimation. Therefore, meaningful 
security needs to have a precise knowledge of the input 
distribution, and this demands considerable human effort and 
collection of a massive number of biometric samples, which is 
expensive process. A notable example is the collection of 
IrisCode by Daugman [28], and claims the IrisCode security by 
argument on the degree of freedom over 11.5 million of 
IrisCode samples. We attempt to relax the security requirement 
due to limited samples and therefore use the maximum collision 
probability denoted as 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max . Formally, 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max =
max{𝑃1, … , 𝑃𝑀𝐼}  is, in principle, the maximum imposter 
matching score of the RV pairs over 𝑀𝐼  scores of different 
query biometric vectors 𝐱′ . This enables us to demonstrate 
security over a smaller sample size that considered the inherited 
nonuniform nature of the biometric vector. 
 Brute-force Attack 
We first argue on the brute-force attack. A brute-force attack 
for SKE refers to a circumstance when an adversary attempts to 
guess the secret directly. 
Let the secret in the finite field be s ∈ ℱ𝑘, where k is the 
polynomial order. The complexity of this attack relies on the 
secret space size i.e. ℱ𝑘. If a secret is encoded in 8 bits, |ℱ| =
28, and 𝑘 = 20 is chosen, then the Brute-force (BF) complexity 
of SKE is 2160 to guess all the polynomial coefficients.  
 False-accept Attack  
False-accept attack (also known as dictionary attack) refers 
to a scenario where an adversary manages to compromise a 
large dataset. He/she can repeatedly attempt to verify the 𝐓𝐀𝐆 
with the compromised biometric instances. In this 
circumstance, the adversary is expected to gain access to the 
system with the probability equal to the nonzero false-accept 
rate (FAR) of the system. As this attack exploits the FAR of the 
biometric system, it is possible to use an artificial template 
generator to launch this attack without the need for 
compromising any dataset. Besides, it is also feasible for any 
adversary with a higher computation power to have better 
modeling on the input biometric distribution, allowing the 
adversary to launch the false-accept attack by randomly 
sampling a fingerprint biometric vector according to the 
specific distribution. From this point of view, the false-accept 
attack complexity can be defined in terms of false-acceptance 
probability that can be calculated in the same way as shown in 
Example 2 with 𝑃2 = (𝑃𝑀𝐼
max)
2
. Therefore, we have the 
maximum false-accept attack complexity over 𝑀𝐼  secret 
retrieval attempts described as  
  
 
𝐟𝐚(𝑚, 𝛿, 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max) = − log (ℙ (𝑡
(𝑃𝑀𝐼
max)
≥ ⌈𝛿𝑚⌉)), 
 
(1) 
 
where 𝑡(𝑃𝑀max) ~ Bin(m, (𝑃𝑀𝐼
max)2). 
 Clearly, unlike the brute-force attack, the false-accept attack 
is independent of ℱ . Therefore, increasing ℱ  would not 
contribute higher false-accept security, and thus we deem the 
false-accept attack is a much stronger attack that could serve as 
the lower bound to brute-force attack through a considerably 
large ℱ could be supplied in practice. 
Apart from this, we also can reason the complexity of the 
false-accept attack as follows. Given a tag𝑖 =
𝐻(𝜑x(𝑖)||𝑠𝑠𝑖||?̂?𝐱(𝑖)) , where 𝜑x(𝑖) ∈ ℱ  and ?̂?𝐱(𝑖) ∈ ℱ , the 
adversary is expected to find a collision on 𝐻 subject to tag𝑖 =
tag′𝑖  after ℱ
2  trials. Therefore if 𝐟𝐚(𝑚, 𝛿, 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max) < ℱ2 , this 
implies that the adversary can find a collision on 𝐻 with less 
number of trials. In such a case, the false-accept attack 
complexity is reduced to the hardness in finding a collision on 
a standard cryptographic one-way hashing function 𝐻. 
 TAG Indistinguishability 
Bellare et al., [20] first introduced the notion of key 
indistinguishability. That is, an adversary has to determine 
whether the ciphertexts were encrypted by the same key. This 
notion arose due to the usability concern when the same keys 
are used across different applications, triggering information 
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leakage. The key privacy notion was later used by Simeons et 
al. [29] in secure sketch whereby each biometric sketching 
function is treated as a probabilistic encryption to study the 
information leakage across multiple sketches [30]. In biometric 
cryptosystems literature, this notion leads to an attack called 
attack via record multiplicity (ARM) [10] or correlation attack 
[31]. 
In SKE, the stored tag is public. We need to evaluate the 
advantages gained by an adversary when the same biometric 
input is used to generate RVs and hence the corresponding tag. 
Formally, this scenario can be characterized in an 
indistinguishability game. In this game, an adversary holds two 
distinctive tags and he attempts to learn from the tags to 
distinguish the tags that are from the same user. The tag that 
corresponds to a particular biometric should hold this 
indistinguishability property to ensure no or negligible 
information can be learned by the adversary. 
Given 𝐱 ∈  ℝ𝑑, nonce 𝐍 and ?̂? with a polynomial 𝑓, the 𝑞-
tag indistinguishability between a challenger and the adversary 
with parameter 𝑚 can be portrayed as follows: 
1. The challenger generates a biometric vector 𝐱 ∈  ℝ𝑑 and 
an RV 𝝓𝐱 = ΩIoM(𝐱, 𝑚, 𝐍). Meanwhile, he generates ?̂?𝐱 = 
ΩIoM(𝐱, 𝑚, ?̂?). He then computes the corresponding 𝐓𝐀𝐆
∗ 
and sends it to the adversary. 
2. The challenger randomly chooses an integer 𝐾 ∈ {1, … , 𝑞} 
and generates a sequence of tags {𝐓𝐀𝐆1, … , 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝑞}. The 
𝐾 -th 𝐓𝐀𝐆  is generated by 𝝓𝐱′ = ΩIoM(𝐱
′, 𝑚, 𝐍)  and 
?̂?𝐱′ = ΩIoM(𝐱
′, 𝑚, ?̂?) from another biometric vector 𝐱′ ∈
 ℝ𝑑 , where S(𝐱, 𝐱′) > 𝛿  and 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) is a fraction of m 
defined in section IV. The rest of the 𝑞 − 1  tags are 
generated by 𝝓𝐱𝑅(𝑗) = ΩIoM(𝐱𝑅(𝑗), 𝑚, 𝐍)  and ?̂?𝐱𝑅(𝑗) =
ΩIoM(𝐱𝑅(𝑗), 𝑚, ?̂?) from random biometric vectors 𝐱𝑅(𝑗) ∈
 ℝ𝑑 , which hold for 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) < 𝛿  where 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞 −
1 . The challenger then sends {𝐓𝐀𝐆1, … , 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝑞}  to the 
adversary. 
3. The adversary outputs an integer 𝐾′ ∈ {1, … , 𝑞} and wins 
if 𝐾′ = 𝐾. 
The adversary's advantage in the 𝑞-tag indistinguishability 
game can be deduced from the n-indistinguishability game 
discussed in [32]. In our context, we measure S(𝐱, 𝐱′)  and 
S(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗))  corresponding to the IoM hashing similarity 
function over 𝛿 ∈ (0,1). We call the adversary as SKE-IND 
adversary with advantages given as follows: 
 
 
AdvSKE−Ind =
𝑞
𝑞 − 1
|ℙ[𝐾′ = 𝐾] −
1
𝑞
|. 
 
(2) 
 
Definition 1: Under the same IoM hashing (identical random 
projection matrix set) setup, an SKE is (𝑞, 𝜖)-indistinguishable 
in 𝛿 ∈ (0,1)  if for any SKE-IND adversary AdvSKE−Ind ≤ 𝜖 
and perfectly indistinguishable if AdvSKE−Ind = 0. 
 
It is crucial to note that the indistinguishability game considers 
the same secret polynomial 𝑓(. ) that is protected under SKE 
through encryption with ?̂?𝐱. In practice, different secrets might 
be protected using the same input ?̂?𝐱 for diverse applications. 
Nonetheless, as the decoding can succeed only when the 
number of unique genuine pairs in 𝐔 is at least the secret size 
i.e. 𝑡 ≥ 𝑘. This implies that as long as 𝑓 is fixed upon order 𝑘 −
1, binding different secrets (coefficient of f) has no significant 
advantage to the adversary. Therefore, our security analysis 
should hold for both cases. Furthermore, the distribution of the 
tag or RV highly depends on the biometric vector, and hence it 
is more appropriate to analyze the information leakage directly 
from 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) with respect to its TAG or RV. Therefore, the 
similarity measurement 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) becomes an important factor in 
deriving AdvSKE−Ind. 
While the indistinguishability game consists of sample 𝐱, 𝐱′ 
and 𝐱𝑅(𝑗) , it is natural to have different unlocking set sizes 
𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′), and 𝑡(𝐱,𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) corresponding to the different cases when 
𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) > 𝛿 , and 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) < 𝛿  for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞 − 1 , 
respectively. We define the false-rejection probability FRP =
1 − ℙ(𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′) ≥ 𝑘) and the false-acceptance probability FAP =
ℙ (𝑡(𝐱,𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) ≥ 𝑘) as the measures of information leakage due to 
𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) and 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)), respectively over the sketches during 
the 𝑞-tag indistinguishability game. This information leakage 
should contribute to the adversary advantages AdvSKE−Ind.  
We now provide a detailed argument on the security of tag- 
indistinguishability with respect to AdvSKE−Ind. Suppose that 
one has nonzero FAP for each secret retrieval attempt. This 
implies that some minimum amount of information must leak 
on each secret retrieval attempt. Conversely, the FRP needs to 
be taken into consideration to avoid overestimation on such 
information leakage. Suppose an adversary possessing 𝐓𝐀𝐆∗ 
and {𝐓𝐀𝐆1, … , 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝑞} . To distinguish 𝐓𝐀𝐆
∗  from 
{𝐓𝐀𝐆1, … , 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝑞}, he needs a biometric vector 𝐱
∗ that satisfies 
both 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱∗) > 𝛿  and 𝑆(𝐱′, 𝐱∗) > 𝛿 . This eventually allows 
him to distinguish the 𝐾-th 𝐓𝐀𝐆 from others by simply running 
a secret retrieval algorithm across all the available tags 
{𝐓𝐀𝐆1, … , 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝑞}  and 𝐓𝐀𝐆
∗ . Clearly, the adversary can 
achieve this with minimum effort if 𝐱∗ = 𝐱′  i.e. by merely 
focusing on a single case 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱∗) > 𝛿 . If the adversary 
manages to distinguish the 𝐾 -th sketch with nonnegligible 
probability i.e. advantage AdvSKE−Ind = 𝜖, it implies he is able 
to find 𝐱∗ = 𝐱′  subject to 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱∗) > 𝛿  with nonnegligible 
probability 𝜖  as well. Therefore, the notion of tag 
indistinguishability captures the possibility of a better solution 
to carry out secret retrieval other than brute-force and false-
accept attacks, stimulated by using the 𝑞 -tag 
indistinguishability game. In such an event, we claim the tag 
indistinguishability is at most as hard as the false-accept attack, 
which can be reduced to the hardness in finding a collision on 
𝐻. 
 
Lemma 1: In a q-tag indistinguishability game, AdvSKE−Ind =
1
𝑞−1
|FAP − FRP|. 
 
Proof: We now argue that the value of 𝜖 follows Definition 1. 
Given that 𝛿 is neither 0 or 1, this means there will be a nonzero 
FAP  for every secret retrieval attempt with 𝐱∗  over the 
𝐓𝐀𝐆𝑗=1,…,𝑞−1 generated from 𝐱𝑅(𝑗). Therefore, the total false-
acceptance probability can be defined as FAP = ∑ FAP𝑗
𝑞−1
𝑗=1 =
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∑ ℙ (𝑡(𝐱𝑅(𝑗),,𝐱) ≥ 𝑘)
𝑞−1
𝑗=1 . On the other hand, the secret retrieval 
would not succeed with probability one but considerable false-
rejection probability FRP = 1 − ℙ (𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′) ≥ 𝑘) . Combining 
these two results leads to ℙ[𝐾′ = 𝐾] =
1
𝑞
(ℙ (𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′) ≥ 𝑘) +
∑ ℙ (𝑡(𝐱𝑅,𝑗,𝐱) ≥ 𝑘)
𝑞−1
𝑗=1 ) =
1
𝑞
(1 − FRP + ∑ FAP𝑗
𝑛−1
𝑗=1 − 1) . It 
follows that AdvSKE−Ind =
1
𝑞−1
|1 − FRP + ∑ FAP𝑗
𝑞−1
𝑗=1 − 1| =
1
𝑞−1
|FAP − FRP| and the lemma is proved. □ 
 
Zero FAR and false-reject rate (FRR) in a biometric 
cryptosystem with limited query instances do not necessarily 
imply perfect indistinguishability, because nonzero FAP  or 
FRP may still exist for every matching. Thus, an information 
leakage measure is required unless one is able to achieve an 
ideal circumstance such as ∑ ℙ (𝑡(𝐱𝑅(𝑗),𝐱) ≥ 𝑘)
𝑞−1
𝑗=1 = 0  and 
ℙ (𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′) ≥ 𝑘) = 1 ; hence AdvSKE−Ind = 0 . This suggests 
𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) = 1 (perfect match) and 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) = 0  (complete 
unlinkability), which would not happen in practice. 
We give an illustration to highlight the computation of 
AdvIoM−Ind under certain parameterization.  
 Example 3: Suppose ℱ = 251 , 𝑚 =  256, 𝑘 = ⌈𝛿𝑚⌉  with 
𝛿 =
1
2
 and 𝐱′  is of 80% similar to 𝐱 such that 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) = 0.8. 
Suppose 𝐱𝑅(𝑗) is only 50% similar with x, so 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) = 0.5. 
Thus 𝑃2 = (S(𝐱, 𝐱′))2  for the former is 0.82 and the latter is 
0.52. It follows 𝑡(𝐱,𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) ~ Bin( 𝑚 , 0.5
2 ) and 𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′) ~ Bin(𝑚 , 
0.82 ). For 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝑗=1,…,𝑞−1 that generated from 𝐱𝑅(𝑗), holds with 
𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) = 0.5, the total false-accept probability is FAP =
 (7.55 × 10−18)(𝑞 − 1) . Besides that, 𝐓𝐀𝐆∗  that generated 
from 𝐱′  holds 𝑆(𝐱, 𝐱′) = 0.8 , so the FRP = 6.30 × 10−5 . 
Based on Lemma 1, AdvSKE−Ind =
1
𝑞−1
|(7.55 × 10−18)(𝑞 −
1) − 1.75 × 10−6|. Suppose there are 𝑞 = 210 ≈ 1024 TAG 
available, AdvSKE−Ind = 1.71 × 10
−9 . These results can 
further be converted into entropy notion as 
− log(AdvSKE−Ind) ~30 bits.  
VI. EXPERIMENTS & DISCUSSION 
In this section, we present a comprehensive performance 
evaluation on secret retrieval. We adopt fingerprint vectors 𝐱 
with length 299 generated from the fingerprint minutiae 
proposed in [24]. The conversion process consists of two 
sequential stages, i.e. generation of the minutia cylinder-code 
[33] with the public available MCC SDK, and kernel principal 
component analysis (KPCA) transformation. 
Our experiments were carried out under FVC 2002 [34] 
(subset DB 1 and 2), FVC 2004 [35] (subset DB 1 and 2), and 
FVC 2006 [36] (subset DB 1). Each of these datasets has Set A, 
which contains 100 × 8 fingerprints for FVC2002 and FVC2004 
and 140 × 12 fingerprints for FVC2006 and Set B, which 
contains 10 × 8 fingerprints in FVC2002 and FVC2004 and 10 
× 12 fingerprints in FVC2006. We used Set B to generate the 
KPCA projection matrix and Set A for secret retrieval 
experiments.  
 Experiments for Performance Evaluation 
We used the full FVC protocol for the genuine and imposter 
attempt test described in [37] as follows:  
Genuine attempt: For each subject, each fingerprint vector 
is used for enrollment, and other fingerprint vectors of the same 
subject are used and try to retrieve the secret with the procedure 
described in Section III(B). For 100 subjects, the procedure 
leads to a total number of (100 × 8 × 7)/2=2800 genuine 
matches, denote as 𝑀𝐺 = 2800. For FVC 2006 DB2, we have 
(140 × 12 × 11)/2=9240 genuine matches. 
Imposter attempt: For each subject, the first fingerprint 
vector is used for enrollment, and the second fingerprint vector 
of other subjects are used to decrypt C for secret retrieval. For 
100 subjects, it leads to a total number of (100 × 99)/2=4950 
imposter matches, as denoted as 𝑀𝐼 = 4950 earlier. For FVC 
2006 DB2, we have (140 × 139)/2=9730 imposter matches. 
Generally, once ℱ is fixed, only two major parameters are 
required to be tuned i.e., (𝛿, 𝑚). In our exposition, we simply 
fixed ℱ = 251 for the experiments. Because both ℱ and 𝑚 are 
the parameters associated to IoM hashing, we fixed 𝑚 = 1024 
as it is the best parameter for ℱ = 251under FVC datasets 
reported in [19]. We repeated the experiments with different 
𝛿 =
𝑘
𝑚
 with k = 8, 12, …, 24. The FRR and FAR of the 
experiment results are tabulated in Table I.  
 From Table I, we observe similar performance trajectories 
for FAR and FRR for all datasets when 𝑘 (or 𝛿) grows large. 
Larger 𝑘 increase the FRR. On the other hand, small 𝑘 does 
improve FRR but unfortunately, impairs FAR. Nevertheless, 
FAR remains extremely small for FVC 2002 and 2004 datasets 
regardless 𝑘, i.e. mostly are zero due to the strong resilience 
property of SKE justified in Section IV. Only for FVC 2006 
DB2, one expects to have 𝑘 > 24 to attain a lower FAR. 
TABLE I: EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR SKE FOR VARIOUS K 
 FVC 
2002 
DB1 
𝑘 =8 𝑘 =12 𝑘 =14 𝑘=16 𝑘=18 𝑘=20 𝑘=24 
FRR(%) 0.29 0.38 0.38 0.52 0.61 0.67 0.76 
FAR(%) 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EER(%) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
FVC 
2002 
DB2 
𝑘 =8 𝑘 =12 𝑘 =14 𝑘=16 𝑘=18 𝑘=20 𝑘=24 
FRR(%) 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.62 
FAR(%) 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EER(%) 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
FVC 
2004 
DB1 
𝑘 =8 𝑘 =12 𝑘 =14 𝑘=16 𝑘=18 𝑘=20 𝑘=24 
FRR(%) 5.90 9.10 10.66 11.89 12.71 13.81 15.43 
FAR(%) 3.95 0.95 0.52 0.38 0.23 0.14 0.09 
EER(%) 4.46 4.46 4.46 4.46 4.46 4.46 4.46 
FVC 
2004 
DB2 
𝑘 =8 𝑘 =12 𝑘 =14 𝑘=16 𝑘=18 𝑘=20 𝑘=24 
FRR(%) 8.33 10.24 11.19 11.91 12.57 13.76 15.05 
FAR(%) 2.72 0.89 0.50 0.42 0.28 0.22 0.12 
EER(%) 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 
FVC 
2006 
DB2 
𝑘 =8 𝑘 =12 𝑘 =14 𝑘=16 𝑘=18 𝑘=20 𝑘=24 
FRR(%) 0.73 1.22 1.52 1.75 2.06 2.38 3.06 
FAR(%) 1.24 0.39 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.06 
EER(%) 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
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 Performance Preservation of SKE 
In this section, we demonstrate that SKE with its best 
parameters manages to preserve the accuracy performance as in 
the original fingerprint vector. Note this is not a trivial task as 
the performance of the original biometric system is often not 
preserved, as the errors will be accumulated when propagated 
to the encryption domain of biometric cryptosystems. Table II 
illustrates the relative performances of three systems in 
different domains i.e. biometric vectors (feature domain), IoM 
hashed vectors (max ranked domain), and SKE (encryption 
domain) in terms of equal error rate (EER). Under the same 
evaluation protocol for genuine and imposter attempts, to our 
surprise, we noticed that SKE attains better performances under 
FVC2002 DB1, FVC2004 DB1, FVC2004 DB2, and FVC2002 
DB2 while FVC2006 DB2 degraded slightly. The performance 
gain could be attributed to the use of the long IoM hashed vector 
(m=1024), error checking mechanism with TAG, and Shamir’s 
secret-sharing scheme. 
 Computation time of SKE 
Table III illustrates the average encoding time defined as 
total time taken
No.  enrollment 
 during enrollment and average decoding time 
defined as 
total time taken
No.  retrieval trials
 according to the genuine and 
imposter attempts with respect to different 𝑘. It is noted that the 
average encoding and decoding times for genuine attempt 
increase when k is tuned larger. On the other hand, the decoding 
time for imposter attempts is close to mean 0.187±0.12  s 
regardless of 𝑘 value. This observation supports the claim that 
one would expect that only a genuine user can retrieve the secret 
with a large amount of unique genuine pairs. 
 Achievable Security over Specific Parameter 
In an ideal circumstance, the SKE can achieve formal 
security favorably as illustrated in Section V. However, due to 
the system performance–security trade-off, it would be good to 
benchmark the achievable security based on the FVC datasets 
with respect to their best parameters (i.e. lowest FRR at FAR = 
0%).  
Recall that the brute-force and false-accept attack complexity 
estimation required the knowledge of maximum collision 
probability 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max  over 𝑀𝐼 imposter matches between different 
RVs. We therefore have recorded the values of 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max obtained 
for different FVC fingerprint datasets with 𝑀𝐼 = 4950, which 
are 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max =0.1006, 0.1279, 0.2047, 0.1846 for FVC2002 DB1, 
DB2, and FVC2004 DB1, DB2 respectively. We opt 𝑚 =
1024, 𝑘 = 54 (𝛿 =
54
1024
), and ℱ = 251, which are exactly the 
parameters used in Table IV and V, for the following security 
evaluations: 
Brute-Force Attack (Section VA): BF can be estimated 
with −log(ℱ𝑘) = −log(251𝑘) ≥ 256 bits. 
False-Accept Attack (Section VB): The maximum false-
accept attack complexity (or maximum achievable system 
entropy) can be estimated from 𝐟𝐚(𝑚, 𝛿, 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max) =
− log (ℙ (𝑡
(𝑃𝑀𝐼
max)
> ⌈𝛿𝑚⌉)) as 71 bits, 43 bits, 10 bits, and 5 
bits for FVC2002 DB1, DB2, and FVC2004 DB1, DB2, 
respectively. Observe that the false-accept attack complexity is 
surprisingly low for a noisy dataset such as FVC2004 DB1, 
DB2.  
TAG Indistinguishability (Section VC): Follow Lemma 1, the 
advantages for SKE-IND adversary can be estimated from 
AdvSKE−Ind =
1
𝑞−1
|FAP − FRP|  where FAP = ∑ FAP𝑗
𝑞−1
𝑗=1 =
∑ ℙ (𝑡(𝐱𝑅(𝑗),,𝐱) ≥ 𝑘)
𝑞−1
𝑗=1  and FRP = 1 − ℙ (𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′) ≥ 𝑘) . 
Because 𝑡(𝐱,𝐱𝑅(𝑗))~Bin(𝑚, S(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗))
2
) and 
𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′)~ Bin(𝑚, S(𝐱, 𝐱′)
2), compute 𝑡(𝐱,𝐱𝑅(𝑗))  and 𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′)  require 
precise knowledge on S(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) and S(𝐱, 𝐱
′). Accordingly, it 
is natural to adopt 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max = S(𝐱, 𝐱𝑅(𝑗)) for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞 − 1. On 
the contrary, ?̅?𝑀𝐺 = S(𝐱, 𝐱
′) is opted to estimate ℙ (𝑡(𝐱,𝐱′) ≥
𝑘), and so FRP = 1 − ?̅?𝑀𝐺, where ?̅?𝑀𝐺 is the average genuine 
matching scores of the RV pairs over 𝑀𝐺 = 2800 of different 
query biometric vectors 𝐱′ . We take FVC 2002 DB1 as an 
instance of estimation where 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max = 0.1006 and ?̅?𝑀𝐺 =
0.5944. Given 𝑞 = 210 , FAP = (210 − 1)(4.53 × 10−22) and 
FRP = 1.11 × 10−16  can be computed, hence AdvSKE−Ind =
1.081 × 10−19 or its entropy form − log(AdvSKE−Ind) = 64 
bits, which is lower than the false-accept complexity at 71 bits. 
Apart from this, it is also numerically verifiable that 
increment of 𝑞 would eventually lead to lower AdvSKE−Ind or 
higher − log(AdvSKE−Ind) . For instance, with 𝑞 =
26, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, the − log(AdvSKE−Ind) = 59, 64, 72, 
71, 71, 71 bits, respectively and sooner will be bounded by the 
false-accept attack complexity. This suggests the presence of a 
TABLE II: VARIOUS BENCHMARKINGS FOR SKE  
Dataset 
Equal Error Rate (EER, %)  
(error rate where FAR = FRR) 
Fingerprint 
Vectors [24] 
(Cosine 
similarity 
measure) 
IoM hashed 
vector 
(𝑚 = 1024, ℱ =
256) 
(Normalized 
Hamming 
distance over 
finite field) 
SKE 
(𝑚 = 1024, 𝛿 =
8
1024
 , ℱ = 251) 
FVC2002 DB1 0.56 0.75 0.75 
FVC2002 DB2 0.28 0.28 0.30 
FVC2004 DB1 4.29 4.73 4.46 
FVC2004 DB2 6.98 6.82 6.64 
FVC2006 DB2 0.70 0.72 0.86 
 
TABLE III: AVERAGE ENCODING AND DECODING RATES (S) OF SKE 
PARAMETERS SET UP 𝑚 = 1024, ℱ = 251 FOR VARIOUS 𝑘 
 Average Encoding Time (sec) 
Average Genuine/ 
Imposter Decoding Time (sec) 
Dataset 𝑘 = 8 𝑘 = 18 𝑘 = 36 𝑘 = 54 𝑘 = 8 𝑘 = 18 𝑘 = 36 𝑘 = 54 
FVC2002 DB1 0.425 0.954 1.612 2.645 
0.361/ 
0.185 
0.453/ 
0.160 
0.678/ 
0.178 
0.985/ 
0.183 
FVC2002 DB2 0.471 0.815 1.710 2.412 
0.593/ 
0.178 
0.6115/ 
0.173 
0.737/ 
0.170 
1.004/ 
0.177 
FVC2004 DB1 0.434 0.858 1.560 2.256 
0.354/ 
0.177 
0.389/ 
0.165 
0.469/ 
0.163 
0.652/ 
0.208 
FVC2004 DB2 0.422 0.916 1.584 2.255 
0.401/ 
0.187 
0.387/ 
0.169 
0.454/ 
0.167 
0.595/ 
0.165 
FVC2006 DB2 0.444 0.903 1.677 2.554 
0.533/ 
0.213 
0.641/ 
0.310 
0.804/ 
0.238 
0.939/ 
0.171 
 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
11 
more efficient algorithm with computation complexity lower 
bounded to false-accept attack complexity. Noticeably, this 
statement holds for any two distinct 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝐬 sourced from similar 
biometric vectors over 𝑞-number of 𝐓𝐀𝐆𝐬. Lower 𝑞 indicates 
that the adversary has a higher chance in retrieving the secret. 
Remarks: Recall that we have relaxed our security 
requirement over a smaller imposter match size (𝑀𝐼), which is 
crucial for 𝑃𝑀𝐼
max estimation. The achievable security does not 
necessary reflect the actual achievable security bound but 
merely for better resilience. In other words, the achievable 
security can be improved through the increment of three 
parameters ℱ, 𝑚, and 𝛿(or 𝑘) ) but trade with an accuracy 
performance degradation. Especially, the field size ℱ that links 
to the secret size is also an important concern in finding a 
collision with any cryptographic one-way hash function 𝐻 . 
Nevertheless, such a relaxation in the security is necessary to 
show more convincing evaluation, especially when the 
biometric samples are limited due to the difficulty in data 
collection. 
 Comparison with Stat-of-the-art 
Given that SKE shares similar ingredients with fuzzy vault 
where both use a polynomial reconstruction mechanism, we 
provide a numerical comparison with state-of-the-art fuzzy 
vault implementations. Table IV tabulates the comparison 
result based on the full FVC testing protocol for genuine and 
imposter attempts. Comparison results in Table V are based on 
the 1vs1 protocol for genuine attempts (e.g. the first sample is 
used to enroll while the second sample is used for secret 
retrieval) and the full FVC protocol for imposter attempts. 
From Table V, we choose SKE with k = 12, 18, and 54 to 
compare with the competing techniques. The former 
outperforms the rest with higher system security (we used 
residue entropy in our case) while the latter shows higher FRR 
compare to the works proposed by Li et al. [38] and Yang et al. 
[39] under FVC2002 DB1 and DB2.  
By following the full FVC protocol, which is considered 
more difficult than the 1vs1 protocol, SKE with k = 12, 31, 36, 
and 45 outperforms others with lower FRRs at FAR = 0% 
(Table IV). 
VII. TEMPLATE PROTECTION PROPERTIES OF SKE 
SKE as a biometric cryptosystem instance can also be 
perceived as a BTP scheme [22] [23]. The BTP must satisfy 
four criteria, namely non-invertibility, unlinkability, 
revocability, and performance. 
In this section, we evaluate SKE on each of these properties, 
mostly focusing on the RV of RSV (e.g. IoM hashing). 
 Noninvertibility 
A BTP scheme should be computationally infeasible to 
reverse engineer the original biometric data from its protected 
template or/and the helper data i.e. sketch and TAG in SKE. 
This prevents the privacy invasion and security attacks on the 
biometric systems. This property is well covered by the TAG 
indistinguishability in Section VC. To be precise, we measure 
the adversary advantage for an adversary trying to compromise 
the SKE through any potential strategies not limited to brute 
force and false accept. We find out given an adversary with pre-
knowledge that two different TAGs among 𝑞 number of tags 
must source from the same user, he/she eventually gains 
advantages and is able to reconstruct the secret with complexity 
lower bounded to the false-accept attack. As we shall see, our 
results show that with 𝑞 = 26, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250 , the 
computed adversary advantages (in bits unit) are 59, 64, 72, 71, 
71, 71 respectively for FVC 2002 DB1. This complexity 
directly implies a compromise of the input biometric data 
without the necessity to reverse engineer the input.  
TABLE IV: COMPARISON WITH EXISTING SCHEMES UNDER FULL FVC 
PROTOCOL WITH PARAMETER SET 𝑚 = 1024, ℱ = 251, AND SPECIFIED 𝑘 =
12, 31, 36, AND 45. 
 
FVC2002 FVC2004 FVC2006 
DB1 DB2 DB1 DB2 DB2 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
Yang 
et al. 
[44] 
≥35.8/11.8 >26.8/10.4 -/- ≥57.6/20.6 -/- 
Yang 
et al. 
[39] 
-/4.5  -/5.99  -/- ≥ 26.1/- -/3.07 
Li et al. 
[38] 
16.6/0 11.5/0 -/- ≥24.8/- - 
Li et al. 
[9] 
/31.2 -/27.7 -/- -/- -/- 
SKE 
( 𝒌=12) 
0.38/0.75 0.38/0.30 -/4.56 -/6.64 -/0.86 
SKE 
(𝒌=31) 
0.92/0.75 0.84/0.30 18.48/4.56 -/6.64 -/0.86 
SKE 
(𝒌=36) 
0.92/0.75 0.99/0.30 22.7/4.56 18.04/6.64 -/0.86 
SKE 
(𝒌=45) 
0.95/0.75 1.23/0.30 24.3/4.56 20.14/6.64 5.46/0.86 
 
TABLE V: COMPARISON WITH EXISTING SCHEMES UNDER 1VS1 PROTOCOL 
WITH PARAMETER SET 𝑚 = 1024, ℱ = 251, AND SPECIFIED 𝑘 = 12, 18, AND 
54. 
 FVC2002 FVC2004 FVC2006 
DB1 DB2 DB1 DB2 DB2 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER 
(%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER 
(%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
FRR (%) 
(FAR=0) 
/EER (%) 
Nandakumar 
et al.  
[11] 
-/- 14.0 -/- -/- -/- 
Li et al. 
 [9] 
14.0/- 8.0/- -/- -/- -/- 
Yang et al. 
[44] 
≥8.0/3.38 >6.0/0.59 -/- ≥41/14.88 -/- 
Yang et al. 
[39] 
4.0/0.0 2.0/1.02 -/- ≥24.72/- -/4.83 
Yang et al. 
[41] 
15.0/0.0 7.0/0.0 -/- -/-  
Tams et al. 
[13] 
-/- 21.0/0.0 -/- -/- -/- 
Li et al.  
[38] 
2.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 -/- 23.4/- -/- 
Nagar et al 
[42] 
- 7.00/0.0 -/- -/- -/- 
Nagar et al. 
[43] 
- -/1.00  -/- -/- -/- 
SKE  
(k=12) 
3.0/0.81 -/0.00 -/3.01 -/3.94 -/1.06 
SKE 
 (k=18) 
4.0/0.81 0.00/0.00 -/3.01 -/3.94 -/1.06 
SKE  
(k=54) 
4.0/0.81 2.00/0.00 20.0/3.01 17.0/3.94 8.57/1.06 
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 Revocability 
The revocability enables a protected template to be revoked 
once compromised and to be replaced with a new one. To 
evaluate the revocability property of SKE empirically, FVC 
2002 DB1 was used for evaluation. Note that TAG in SKE is 
merely constructed by RV (or IoM hashed vector), and 
therefore IoM hashing is used in the experiment. The first 
fingerprint sample of each subject was used to generate a total 
number of eight distinctive RVs with different random 
Gaussian matrices (e.g. eight numbers of different nonce 
𝐍1, … , 𝐍8 ). Each RV was used for SKE enrollment. During 
retrieval, we followed the same protocol as discussed in Section 
VIA for imposter and genuine attempts. A total number of 4950 
trials for imposter attempts and 2800 trials for genuine attempts 
were recorded. However, because different nonce is used, we 
named the genuine attempt (under same subject) as pseudo 
imposter attempt follows [19].  
 Figure 3 shows the pseudo imposter score and imposter 
score, which corresponds to the normalized genuine pairs 
count. As expected, the distribution of both pseudo imposter 
and imposter attempts are highly similar and overlapped. This 
suggests that the RV derived from the newly generated RVs 
with different nonce over the same subject are indistinguishable 
from the RV generated from others. Therefore, the new RV 
generation indeed can be used to replace the old one and 
revocability is satisfied.  
 Unlinkability 
The unlinkability criterion demands that the protected 
biometric data should not be differentiated whether they are 
generated from the same user’s biometrics. This is to prevent 
matching across different applications (cross-matching). For 
unlinkability evaluation of SKE, we followed the newly 
proposed unlinkability framework by Gomez-Barrero et al., 
(2018) [40]. 
 The unlinkability evaluation was carried out with FVC2002 
DB1, FVC2002 DB2, FVC2004 DB1 and FVC2004 DB2. To 
do so, for every sample in the dataset, different nonce  were 
applied to generate the RV pair (𝝓𝐱 , ?̂?𝐱). Each RV pair was 
used for SKE enrollment.  
Let ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑚) and ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑛𝑚) be the probability densities of a 
given similarity score 𝑠 ∈ [0,1]  that being computed from 
mated samples, 𝐻𝑚 i.e. same subjects and nonmated samples 
𝐻𝑛𝑚  i.e. different users, respectively. In our exposition, 
ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑚) and ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑛𝑚) refer to the probability density of the 
normalized number of revealed genuine pairs (equivalent to 
similarity score 𝑠 ) for genuine and imposter attempts, 
respectively. A total number of 2800 genuine attempts and 4950 
imposter attempts for each dataset were recorded. 
 Given a likelihood ratio 𝐿𝑅(𝑠) = ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑚)/ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑛𝑚), the 
unlinkability property can be characterized by the local 
linkability measure D↔(𝑠) and the global linkability measure 
D↔
𝑠𝑦𝑠
 defined as: 
 D↔(𝑠) = 2 
𝐿𝑅(𝑠)∙𝜔
1+𝐿𝑅(𝑠)∙𝜔
− 1,  
(3) 
 
where we set 𝜔 ∈ [0,1] = 1 and 
 
 D↔
𝑠𝑦𝑠
= ∫ ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑚) ∙  D↔(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 .  
(4) 
 
 In brief, D↔(𝑠) ∈ [0,1]  reports an increasing degree of 
linkability. Thus, high D↔(𝑠)  suggests the revelation of the 
genuine pair through authenticating TAG(TAG’) within mated 
samples. Figure 4 depicts ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑚)  and ℙ(𝑠|𝐻𝑛𝑚)  under 
genuine attempt (mated) and imposter attempt (nonmated) for 
secret retrieval on the four datasets. It is clearly shown that the 
score distribution for mated and nonmated instances are highly 
overlapped. This implies that it is unable for an adversary to 
differentiate whether the RV pairs (𝝓𝐱′ , ?̂?𝐱′) and (𝝓𝐱 , ?̂?𝐱) 
(sourced from different biometric vector 𝐱 and 𝐱′ respectively) 
are generated from the same fingerprint samples or not. 
Additionally, the near to zero values of D↔
𝑠𝑦𝑠
 for four datasets 
i.e. 0.0406, 0.0290, 0.0692,  and 0.0126  of FVC2002 DB1, 
FVC2002 DB2, FVC2004 DB1 and FVC2004 DB2, 
respectively suggest that the linkability of the RVs pairs used is 
highly unlikely.  
 Performance 
The performance criterion of BTP demands that the accuracy 
performance of the protected system should not be poorer than 
its original counterpart. The performance preservation from 
fingerprint vector to IoM hashed vector and to SKE has been 
  
Fig. 3: Pseudo imposter score and imposter score in 
FVC2002 DB1 
 
Fig. 4: Mated, nonmated score distributions and D↔(𝑠) plots for FVC2002 DB1, DB2, FVC2004 DB1 and B2 (left to right). 
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well discussed under Section VI(B) and the results are tabulated 
in Table II. 
Besides, we also provide a discussion on the parameter m, 
which is another critical factor to determine the SKE 
performance. Note that the number of revealed unique genuine 
pairs in 𝐔 = {(𝜑x(𝑗), 𝑓(𝜑x(𝑗))}𝑗=1
𝑡
 follows 𝑡~ Bin(𝑚, 𝑃2) and 
𝔼(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑃2 (Section IV). By this means, the effect of 𝑚 can 
be empirically examined through observing the mean values of 
the number of revealed unique genuine pairs for genuine and 
imposter attempts. Figure 5 shows that the means of both 
genuine (red) and imposter (blue) curves remain unchanged 
irrespective to 𝑚  whereas the variances shrink when 𝑚 
increases from 128, 512, and 1024. Hence, the net effect is the 
gradual separation of genuine and imposter curves when 𝑚 
becomes large, resulting in a better secret retrieval rate in terms 
of FAR and FRR. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed an SKE scheme for vectorial 
biometric secret binding. The SKE is composed of an RV pair 
that resembles the encryption-decryption key pair in symmetric 
cryptosystems, along with a simple filtering mechanism and 
Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme for error checking and 
correction. The SKE possesses a strong resilient property and 
was empirically validated by the five subsets of FVC fingerprint 
benchmark. However, the scheme is not limited to fingerprint 
and can be applied to any biometric features that is manifested 
in the vector form. The security threat of SKE was also 
established and analyzed upon the random error model, which 
can be characterized by the similarity measure over the input 
biometric vector by resilient set vectorizer (IoM hashing). In a 
nutshell, we offer an alternative to exploit the biometric input 
structure while RSV, which implicitly allows one to measure 
the similarity of the input biometric vectors. Such an 
exploitation is crucial, especially for more complete security 
evaluation over the non-uniformity of the input biometric. We 
believe that our security model will benefit future cryptographic 
research on biometrics, whereby error tolerance and 
nonuniformity must be taken into consideration.  
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